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Abstract: A tremendous growth in wireless traffic volumes and a shortage of feasible 
radio spectrum has led to a situation where the old and rigid spectrum regime is not a 
viable option for spectrum management and a shift towards a more market driven 
approach has begun. Great uncertainty still exists over how such a radio spectrum market 
will come about and what kind of shape it would take. This paper studies some long term 
macro level evolution possibilities for how this radio spectrum market could emerge and 
what would be the corresponding value chain configurations. The scenario planning and 
system dynamics methods are utilized to build four alternative future spectrum market 
scenarios. 
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t is commonly agreed that one of the most crucial resources for mobile 
networks in the future will be the radio frequency spectrum. Thus, the 
key challenge in designing future mobile networks will be the sharing of 
the scarce radio spectrum.  
Meanwhile the internet is increasingly going wireless and there is a clear 
trend towards vastly growing volumes of wireless traffic. This growth is 
fueled mostly by the diffusion of high bandwidth consuming applications 
such as on-demand video and Peer-to-Peer content distribution, and by a 
notable increase in the number of wirelessly connected devices. The most 
extreme estimates predict scenarios where ubiquitous wireless connectivity 
is given, mobile devices are the primary means for Internet access and 7 
trillion wireless devices serve 7 billion people by 2017 (UUSITALO, 2006). 
Even if these scenarios would realize themselves only partly, it is likely that 
wireless traffic demand will experience tremendous growth which will in turn 
result in a massive increase in the demand for radio spectrum. At the same 
time strong evidence has been presented that parts of the licensed spectrum 
are severely underutilized (OLAFSSON et al., 2006). These observations 
have challenged the inflexible planned economy based command-and-
control regimes of spectrum management and a shift towards a more 
efficient and market driven spectrum management has begun. Nevertheless, 
great uncertainty still exists over how such a radio spectrum market will 
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come about, and what will be the forces shaping the evolution. For example 
the question of how liberal spectrum regulation will become and how fast this 
will happen is still to be answered. Spectrum hoarding by the incumbent 
spectrum owners might also be one force that disturbs the liquidity of the 
markets (XAVIER & YPSILANTI, 2006; CHAPIN & LEHR, 2007). Some have 
also speculated whether there even actually is a scarcity of spectrum 
(GLOVER & NEVOKEE, 2007) and a need for more flexible spectrum 
management. This paper tries to identify and model these and other trends 
and uncertainties and identify long term macro level evolution possibilities for 
how a radio spectrum market could emerge. The scenario planning and 
system dynamics methods are utilized to build four alternative future 
spectrum market scenarios. 
   Methodology 
The methodology used is Scenario Planning (SCHOEMAKER, 2000) 
which is a tool typically used for long range business planning and decision 
making under uncertainty, but which can also be utilized to analyze macro 
level development of an industry (SMURA & SORRI, 2009). It follows a ten 
step process shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 - Ten steps of the Scenario Planning methodology. 
# Step 
1  Define the issues you wish to understand better in terms of time frame, scope, and 
decision variables. 
2  Identify the major stakeholders or actors who would have an interest in these issues, 
and their current roles, interests, and power positions. 
3  Identify and study the main forces that are shaping the future within the scope, 
covering the social, technological, economic, environmental, and political domains. 
4  Identify trends or predetermined elements that will affect the issues of interest from the 
list of main forces. 
5  Identify key uncertainties (forces deemed important whose outcomes are not very 
predictable) from the list of main forces. Examine how they interrelate. 
6  Select the two most important key uncertainties, and cross their outcomes in a matrix. 
Add suitable outcomes from other key uncertainties, as well as trends and 
predetermined elements to all scenarios. 
7  Assess the internal consistency and plausibility of the initial scenarios, revise. 
8  Assess how the key stakeholders might behave in the revised scenarios. 
9  See if certain interactions can be formalized in a quantitative model. 
10  Reassess the uncertainty ranges of the main variables of interest, and express more 
quantitatively how each variable looks under different scenarios. T. CASEY  111 
The beginning of the analysis (steps 1 and 2) consists of a scope 
definition and the identification of the major stakeholders and the value 
network they form. In steps 3 to 5 the main forces shaping the future within 
the scope of the study are indentified and analyzed in terms of their 
importance and uncertainty. The idea is also to study how the uncertainty 
forces interrelate and in order to make the analysis a bit more thorough, we 
will complement the scenario planning process by using a method called 
system dynamics to get a deeper understanding of the interaction between 
these forces 1. 
In steps 6 and 7 four alternative future scenarios are constructed based 
on two most important uncertainties. After this, in step 8, the stakeholder 
behavior and reconfiguration of the value network will be analyzed. In the 
end, steps 9 and 10 are aimed at elaborating the results quantitatively. In 
this study we will not do the quantitative modeling but leave it for future work. 
The work presented here is partly based on Local Area Access 
provisioning scenarios developed by SMURA & SORRI (2009). Here we will 
try to expand those from the point of view of spectrum management and 
especially try to elaborate on the corresponding dynamics. In addition to this, 
three expert interviews were conducted for background research. 
   Scenario planning analysis 
In this chapter we will conduct the analysis according to the Scenario 
Planning methodology described above. The analysis conducted here is not, 
by any means, meant to be exhaustive but should serve as a starting point in 
tackling the complex issue. The research question for our study is defined as 
follows: 
"How is radio frequency spectrum managed in the future within a time 
frame extending from 2010 to 2025?" 
                       
1 The combination of scenario planning and system dynamics also resembles a methodology 
created by the MIT CFP Value Chain Working Group (KLYM & TROSSEN, 2006). 112     No. 75, 3
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Stakeholders 
The stakeholders and actors interested in how the spectrum is shared 
can be categorized into 5 groups: 
• National and international spectrum regulators controlling the 
spectrum markets; 
•  Wireless network operators who own and operate the networks, are 
temporary owners of the spectrum and provide wireless access and services 
over the spectrum band; 
•  End-users for whom a service (e.g. mobile voice, internet connectivity 
or broadcasted television) is delivered to over the spectrum band; 
•  Device vendors providing terminals through which the services are 
delivered; and 
•  Service and content producers and providers. 
In addition to the regulator, out of these groups the network operator 
group could be classified as a very interested stakeholder. The network 
operator group includes incumbent Cellular Mobile Network Operators 
(MNO) (cellular operators from here on) covering larger regions, Local Area 
(LA) Wireless Network Operators operating locally, Fixed Network Operators 
who could be considered as possible entrants to the spectrum markets and 
also end-users deploying their own private wireless networks 2. Figure 1 (a-
b) presents a simplified description of the value network for providing 
wireless services and the corresponding service delivery infrastructure 3. 
As can be seen, wireless access network provisioning is currently more 
or less split between Cellular and Local Area operators where the latter 
mostly consist of end-users deploying a WiFi network over the unlicensed 
band at their homes in order to share a cable, Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) 
or other fixed access privately. Roughly stated the same the division could 
be made between the centrally driven telecom world (mainly driven by 3GPP 
and 3GPP2) and the internet world (spearheaded by IEEE technologies) 
emerging from the edges. 
                       
2 In this study we won't discuss broadcasting operators in detail but will put most of the focus on 
cellular and Local Area wireless network operators. 
3 The service delivery infrastructure can be defined as the architectural components required to 
deliver and consume the service (KLYM & TROSSEN, 2006). T. CASEY  113 
Figure 1 - Current value network and service delivery infrastructure for mobile services 
(adapted from SMURA & SORRI, 2009) 
 
Although the service delivery infrastructure does not yet contain a 
dedicated spectrum broker, in the current setting the regulator could be seen 
as one (only with very long brokering cycles). Also the network planning and 
optimization that a cellular operator does to serve a certain spatially 
distributed traffic demand can be thought of as spectrum brokering within the 
spectrum band licensed for the operator to operate the cellular network. 
In terms of service provisioning one option for value network 
configuration is that a single user has several contractual agreements e.g. 
with the device vendor(s) (through a retailer), with the access provider(s) 
and with service provider(s). This would correspond to a rather horizontal 
industry structure. Then again in some markets the cellular operators have 
made a single vertically integrated service consisting of the terminal, access 
and service thus requiring the customer to only have one contractual 
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Main forces affecting the future 
Next we will conduct a preliminary analysis of the main forces shaping 
the future of spectrum management. The analysis is done in four domains: 
social, regulatory (i.e. political), economic, and technology 4.  
Social forces 
From the social point of view the core issue is the degree of growth in 
wireless traffic capacity and spectrum demand. The demand is largely 
dependent on the growth and diffusion of high bandwidth consuming 
applications, mainly the different ways to distribute video (CISCO, 2009, e.g. 
predicts that almost 64 percent of the world's mobile traffic will be video by 
2013).  
Another factor is the degree of substitution of wired connectivity with 
wireless. People are gradually getting used to being able to roam around 
freely while being always connected. Then again, in terms of mobile services 
most of the value has been in mobile voice and it is an uncertainty whether 
there will be a similar migration with other applications from fixed to mobile 
as there was from fixed voice to mobile voice. 
The increase in the number of connected devices is potentially another 
major contributor for wireless traffic demand. Although the traffic volumes 
that secondary devices (like household appliances) generate might be rather 
modest, if the number of devices grows substantially they might cumulate to 
very high volumes of traffic.  
Furthermore, flat rate pricing of mobile broadband is becoming 
increasingly more common and has sparked a hefty increase in data 
utilization rates (MÖLLERYD et al., 2009). Flat rate seems to be the 
preferred pricing method for the end-users (MITOMO et al., 2007) and the 
diffusion of the flat rate pricing scheme might become a major driver for the 
need for more spectrum. Yet another rising trend is the fear of radio 
emissions. If this trend reinforces itself, it might have severe negative effects 
to wireless traffic demand. 
                       
4 Many of the forces that are analyzed below were originally identified by SMURA & SORRI 
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A crucial question is will the demand for wireless bandwidth and 
spectrum surpass the supply. Although there is much hype about the 
tremendous growth in wireless traffic volumes, it might in the end remain 
reasonable and other technology advancements (e.g. the roll-out of multiple-
input and multiple-output (MIMO) technologies) might be able to cater to the 
demand increase, which in turn might question the need for flexible 
frequency usage. For example, GLOVER & NEVOKEE (2007) concluded 
that without spectrum scarcity, the concept of Flexible frequency usage adds 
little value. 
Regulatory (political) forces 
There remains a great deal of uncertainty whether market based 
spectrum regulation will be facilitated in a more harmonized (everybody 
using the same technologies and spectrum bands) or liberal manner 
(fragmented technologies and spectrum bands). Hence a core question in 
terms of spectrum regulation is how liberal it will become. 
In the traditional spectrum management regime the use (technology and 
service), ownership (license holder) and spectrum are tightly integrated. This 
has been the case for example in broadcasting and also with cellular 
operators. In order to enable a more market driven way for spectrum 
management the knit between ownership and spectrum needs to be broken. 
Roughly stated there are two approaches to accommodate this  5 
(OLAFSSON et al., 2006):  
•  Spectrum trading/leasing which enables the temporary or permanent 
transfer of Spectrum Usage Rights (SUR) from one entity to another; and  
•  Opportunistic access where devices are allowed to sense and utilize 
unused spectrum resources in licensed bands without disturbing primary 
users (either with a commons approach or with the secondary user possibly 
providing some kind of reimbursement to the spectrum owner) 6. 
                       
5 The unlicensed bands where everyone has a right to access the spectrum (as long as they 
follow a certain spectrum etiquette) can also be viewed as flexible usage of the radio 
frequencies but since it does not come with any ownership of spectrum or any need for 
reimbursement, we won't consider it as being part of the spectrum markets. 
6 In addition to unbundling ownership from spectrum by allowing secondary leasing or 
opportunistic access, the regulator can bring more flexibility to spectrum management e.g. by 
allowing spectrum refarming and the allocation of a spectrum band in a technology and/or 
service neutral manner (e.g. in many countries in Europe the 900 MHz band, originally allocated 
for GSM, can now also be utilized by WCDMA). 116     No. 75, 3
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Secondary leasing of spectrum is gradually getting common. Many 
upcoming spectrum auctions in Europe will include bands where secondary 
leasing is permitted and which are in some cases also assigned in a 
technologically neutral manner. Other countries like Australia, New Zealand, 
Guatemala, Canada and the USA have already been permitting these for a 
longer time (XAVIER & YPSILANTI, 2006). In terms of opportunistic access 
there are also some first steps currently ongoing e.g. with white space  7 
usage in the US. In addition to liberalization the regulator can use tools such 
as Administrative incentive pricing (AIM) to promote the liquidity of spectrum 
by imposing a cost on spectrum hoarding. 
Although the migration towards more liberal spectrum regulation seems 
certain, it should be done incrementally and with care, since there is a threat 
of losing control of the spectrum market which might in turn lead to many 
negative effects such as excessive interference, interworking and roaming 
difficulties between networks or to the sole deployment of most profitable 
services, which might in turn jeopardize the provisioning of some critical 
public services (XAVIER & YPSILANTI, 2006). Since centralized control and 
harmonization mitigate these negative effects it is uncertain what is the 
optimal balance between a harmonized and liberalized approach so that the 
benefits from both could be reaped. 
Economic forces 
The incumbent operators are naturally favoring the harmonized approach 
since it decreases risks regarding the diffusion of the technologies they have 
invested in and guarantees economies of scale effects. The new entrants 
and advocates of alternative technologies are then again favoring a more 
liberal approach that allows secondary leasing and technology/service 
neutrality since it makes it easier for them to penetrate the markets and 
reduces their risks of entry because there remains also value for exit.  
However, even though the regulator would liberalize its regulation, it does 
not guarantee that the spectrum will be used more efficiently by the 
incumbents. Since most markets for example in the Cellular Operator 
business resemble an oligopoly, it might lead to a situation where the few 
incumbent Significant Market Power (SMP) operators would hoard the 
spectrum, not secondary lease it and try lock-out entrants, in fear of losing 
                       
7 White spaces refer to frequencies allocated to a broadcasting service but not used locally. T. CASEY  117 
their power in the market. Other reasons for low spectrum leasing activity by 
the incumbents might be caused by a perception that future increases in 
value make it worthwhile to hold on to the spectrum, or by a perception that 
partitioning of the spectrum band would reduce its value. Other reasons 
might be a fear of transaction and opportunity costs that exceed the potential 
benefits/revenues gained from spectrum trading/leasing or a fear of cost 
caused from satisfying regulatory requirements. The regulator can mitigate 
these by designing well functioning market mechanisms and using tools 
such as Administrative incentive pricing (XAVIER & YPSILANTI, 2006). 
Another reason for the reluctance of cellular operators might be the fact 
that most of the value is still in rather strongly vertically integrated mobile 
voice and Short Messaging Services (SMS) where 3GPP based 
technologies dominate.  For these, services, technologies and spectrum 
bands are strongly bundled and the same combination of spectrum bands 
and technologies are used worldwide in order to enable roaming and 
guarantee economies of scale advantages. Nevertheless, the vertical 
industry structure is currently shifting towards a horizontal form where 
disruptive technologies - such as flexible frequency usage and VoIP (Voice 
over IP) and political pressure (regulators actions to promote competition) 
fuel the decoupling. For example CHAPIN & LEHR (2007) see that flexible 
frequency usage promotes both the vertical disintegration and horizontal 
integration of these existing wireless service market silos. The resulting 
horizontal structure could open doors for new strong players (e.g. large 
internet service providers) to expand their power in the value chain around 
the spectrum resource. 
If the spectrum markets start to work more efficiently, another uncertainty 
is how decentralized and local the markets will become. The incumbent 
Cellular operators could naturally favor a clearly centralized market where 
the control of the brokering, trading and leasing processes remain with a 
few. Still, the spectrum is a local resource and one could argue that it can be 
managed most efficiently in a decentralized manner with local control and 
market facilitators. If the number of new entrants would grow, it might 
naturally lead to fragmentation and local spectrum markets. Regardless 
whether they are centralized or distributed, new entities, such as spectrum 
databases (or spectrum use registries) and spectrum brokers (or spectrum 
distributors) are likely to emerge (CHAPIN & LEHR, 2007). 118     No. 75, 3
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Technology forces 
In terms of technology both secondary trading of licensed spectrum and 
opportunistic access to the licensed spectrum are in early stages of 
development and the way they will actually realize themselves is heavily 
dependent on technological advancements. 
In its most simple form spectrum trading refers only to the temporary or 
permanent selling of complete spectrum licenses. In such a case, the 
brokering cycles would still remain rather long. In order for spectrum trading 
and leasing to reach its full potential only fragments of the spectrum should 
be traded within short time-scales. These kinds of complex trading systems 
could facilitate dynamic pricing of the spectrum and eventually create the 
basis for a 'real-time' and 'liquid' spectrum market (OLAFSSON et al., 2006). 
Such a real-time brokering system would also need some kind of a 
subsystem that monitors the utilization of frequency bands in a given 
location or at least a platform where the interested parties could report their 
spectrum utilization rates. Such spectrum brokers are also needed to reduce 
transaction costs resulting from spectrum trading or leasing (CHAPIN & 
LEHR, 2007). Interference might also become an issue, the more 
fragmented the trading becomes, and as a result automatic enforcement of 
Spectrum Usage Rights (SURs) might become very challenging. A central 
question is also how decentralized the intelligence in wireless networks will 
become especially in terms of spectrum brokering and what entity will act as 
the broker.  
In opportunistic access to the licensed spectrum devices are able to 
sense and utilize unused spectrum resources in the licensed band without 
disturbing the primary users of the spectrum  8. The feasibility of this 
approach greatly depends on the development of Cognitive Radio (CR) 
techniques and the corresponding architectures. Roughly stated there are 
three alternatives for the technical architecture: a fully autonomous, a 
collaborative and decentralized, and a centralized approach (OLAFSSON et 
al., 2006). 
In the fully autonomous approach each device operates independently 
and optimizes its own operation in relation to the radio activity. In an extreme 
case this could be thought of as an everyman's right to access spectrum and 
                       
8 These secondary users could possibly also be subscribers but would pay less to the license 
band owner for a more 'best effort'-like service. T. CASEY  119 
would thus need a set of etiquette rules. Out of the three this is technically 
the most challenging architecture since it needs very intelligent and cognitive 
devices. The less ambitious collaborative and decentralized architecture 
features Cognitive Radios that form groups where each member senses 
spectrum availability and distributes this information within the group through 
a separate control channel. The simplest solution is a centralized 
architecture where the cognitive radio devices can only access a section of 
spectrum reserved by the regulator and managed by brokers and databases. 
Overall, the maturity of these technologies and the perceived risk of 
interference must be reduced to an acceptably low level for the market to 
start working in a healthy manner (CHAPIN & LEHR, 2007). One of the most 
important technical enablers for flexible spectrum usage is the development 
of Software Defined Radio (SDR) which greatly enhances devices radio 
intelligence and re-configurability (KOCH, 2009). So far it has been mostly 
used for Base Stations and although some are estimating that its diffusion 
will be fast, there still remains uncertainty on how widely it will penetrate 
terminals and in general on how fast it will evolve.  
Yet another force that might have an effect on the diffusion of flexible 
spectrum usage is the surplus of existing licensed and unlicensed bands. 
For example the 5 GHz unlicensed band is still largely unutilized and the 
digital dividend that is released by the switch in broadcasting technologies 
from analogue to digital will further cater to the needs. If the demand at the 
same time would remain reasonable one could question whether there 
actually is a spectrum shortage. Another open issue is whether the radio 
interface will actually be the bottleneck or will it (at least partly) be in the 
wired backhaul of the access network. The diffusion rate of fiber 
deployments and more advanced DSL technologies enabling higher wired 
bandwidth might not keep up with the pace of radio development. 
Importance, uncertainty and interaction of the forces 
Now that we have identified and discussed some of the main forces that 
could have an effect on how the spectrum markets evolve in the future we 
will prioritize them in terms of their importance and uncertainty, and study 
how they interact with each other. The forces discussed in the previous 
section are first categorized into trends and uncertainties based on their 
relative uncertainty (i.e. for trends, outcomes can be seen as more 
predictable) and prioritized based on their importance. The categorized list of 120     No. 75, 3
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forces is depicted in Table 2. The following step in the scenario planning 
procedure is the examination of how the uncertainties interrelate. As a 
starting point for this, an estimation of the causal relationships between the 
uncertainty forces is presented in Table 3 that can be read so that the forces 
in the rows have an effect on the forces in the columns. A plus sign indicates 
an effect in the same direction (e.g. as device intelligence and re-
configurability (U7) grows, spectrum regulation (U3) can become more 
liberal). A minus sign indicates an effect in the reverse direction (e.g. as 
interference problems (U10) increase, spectrum regulation (U3) becomes 
less liberal). The number of the minus or plus signs indicates the strength of 
the effect. If the box connecting the forces is empty they have no (major) 
causal linkage in that direction. 
Table 2 - The identified forces categorized into trends and uncertainties 
Trends   Uncertainties  
T1 (Econ.)  Incumbent operator's fear of 
new entrants and losing 
control of the market 
U1 
(Tech./Econ.)
Locality of spectrum markets 
T2 (Pol.)  Threat for regulator of losing 
control of the spectrum market 
U2 (Econ.)  Vertical integration in the industry 
(services, access tech, frequency) 
T3 (Pol.)  Allocation and utilization of 
unlicensed bands 
U3 (Pol.)   Liberalization in spectrum 
regulation 
T4 (Soc./Tech.)  Growth in number of 
connected devices 
U4 (Tech.)  Decentralization of intelligence in 
wireless networks 
T5 (Soc.)   Substitution of wired with 
wireless 
U5 (Soc.)   Demand for additional spectrum 
T6 (Soc./Tech.)  Growth of high bandwidth 
consuming applications 
U6 (Econ.)  Possibility and willingness of 
incumbent spectrum owners to use 
the spectrum more efficiently 
T7 (Econ.)  Incresed number of local 
operators 
U7 (Tech.)  Device intelligence and re-
configurability 
T8 (Soc.)   Fear of radio emissions  U8 (Econ.)  Vertical integration decoupling 
forces (disruptive technology, 
regulator, demand for more 
flexibility) 
T9 (Soc.)  Diffusion of flat rate pricing  U9 (Econ.)  Expansion power of the strongest 
player in the value chain (e.g. 
network operator, service provider) 
T10 (Tech.)  Bottleneck in backhaul  U10 (Tech.)  Interference issues 
Before digging deeper into the explanations between these causal 
interrelations, we will divert slightly from the Scenario Planning method, and 
draw a system dynamic model of the interactions of the uncertainties. The 
model is presented in Figure 2 and it also includes the trend forces. System 
dynamics is a good method for understanding the underlying interactions of 
a complex system (STERNMAN, 2000). It can for example be used to 
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(negative) loops that a system might have. In Figure 2 these loops are 
highlighted with the circle-like comments starting either with the letter R 
(reinforcing) or B (balancing). A reinforcing loop consists of a circle of causal 
relationships whose causal product, i.e. product of the plus and minus signs, 
is positive (e.g. R_local where the causal relationships between U1 and U4 
in both directions are positive). A balancing loop consists of a circle of causal 
relationships whose causal product is negative (e.g. B_incumb where the 
two causal relationships from U5 to U6 and from U6 to "Supply for wireless 
bandwidth" are positive and the relationship from "Supply for wireless 
bandwidth" to U5 is negative).  
Table 3 - Causal relationships between the uncertainty forces 
    U1 U2 U3  U4 U5 U6 U7 U8 U9  U10 
U1           ++                   
U2                       ++  +    
U3                 ++     +        
U4  ++                            
U5         ++        ++             
U6  ++                            
U7        +++  ++    +       ++       
U8     - -                         
U9     ++                         
U10        - - -                      
Overall when looking at the forces we can see a clear demand-supply 
kind of a relationship where the increased Demand for more wireless 
bandwidth (U5) is supplied by more efficient usage of the spectrum. The 
Demand for more wireless bandwidth (U5) is driven by an increase in the 
Number of connected devices (T4), growing substitution of wired 
connectivity with wireless (T5), the growth in video and other high bandwidth 
consuming applications (T6), and the diffusion of flat rate pricing (T9). Fear 
of radio emissions (T8) and the degree of backhaul being the bottleneck 
(T10) have a negative impact on the growth.  
This growth in traffic demand is catered by different balancing loops 
whose relational strengths might vary (i.e. one balancing loop can cater to 
more of the traffic demand than others). In the B_incumb balancing loop, the 
increased wireless traffic demand (U5) drives the incumbent cellular cellular 
operators (who own most of the spectrum) to use the spectrum more 
efficiently (U6) and thus increase the supply. They might try to do it in a way 
that prevents new entrants coming into the market. The strength of this loop 122     No. 75, 3
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might be decreased by the operator's fear of new entrants and losing control 
of the market (T1). In the B_regul balancing loop the growing traffic demand 
(U5) pressures the regulator to liberalize its regulation policies (U3) which 
facilitates the spectrum owners to use their spectrum resource more 
efficiently (U6) (this might be facilitated also with administrative incentive 
pricing). An increase in the device intelligence and re-configurability (U7) 
might contribute to the strength of the loop whereas an increase of 
interference (U10) might hinder the strength of the loop.  
Figure 2 - System dynamics model of the trends and uncertainties 
(*) 
 
(*) It should be noted that this is just one way of representing the interactions between forces and 
that alternative interpretations can exist. 
Overall the regulator might want to liberalize its policies only gradually 
due to the threat of losing control of the spectrum market (T2) which could in 
effect also make the loop weaker. In the B_local balancing loop the 
increased wireless demand (U5) drives the incumbent operators who own 
most of the spectrum to lease and sell it forward to new entrants and local 
area operators who can make small scale market entries and scale up their 
capacity as needed. This can eventually lead to fragmented local spectrum 
markets (U1) that are agile and able to cater to the local spectrum demand. 
This locality is reinforced by the decentralization of intelligence in wireless 
networks (U4) which is in turn also positively affected by device intelligence T. CASEY  123 
and re-configurability (U7). The decentralization of intelligence in wireless 
networks (U4) might further fuel the locality of spectrum markets (U1) thus 
forming a reinforcing cycle R_local that supports the decentralization of 
spectrum markets.  
There is also a possibility that a major part of the wireless traffic demand 
is catered by the B_unlic balancing cycle, where the traffic growth (U5) leads 
to the allocation of new unlicensed bands which in turn leads to an increased 
number of local operators (T7) (mostly end users deploying private wireless 
networks). This installed base could further reinforce the decentralization of 
spectrum markets (U1). Apart from demand and supply, another interesting 
domain is the degree of vertical integration in the industry and the forces 
affecting it. The R_vert reinforcing loop describes how the strongest 
player(s) in the value chain use their vertically expanded position (U9) to 
extend, or at least sustain the industry vertically integrated in its favor (U2) 
which further reinforces its capabilities for expansion. However, as vertical 
integration grows and some actors become too powerful, balancing forces 
(U8) usually emerge. These could be for example political pressure for the 
regulator to increase competition - or liberalize spectrum regulation (U3), or 
disruptive technologies - like the internet, flexible frequency usage or the 
growing trend of device intelligence (U7). These emerging decoupling forces 
establish a balancing loop that drives the industry structure back towards a 
horizontal form (B_horiz) 9. 
Scenario construction 
Next we will select the two most important uncertainties, and use them to 
construct four alternative future scenarios. Based on the relative importance 
of the uncertainties and the correlation properties (the two uncertainties 
should be as uncorrelated as possible) we will choose U1 (the locality and 
decentralization of spectrum markets) and U2 (the degree of vertical 
integration in the industry) 10.  
                       
9 The double helix theory has been suggested as one natural explanation of the cycle between 
a vertically and horizontally structured industry (VCDWG 2005). 
10 By choosing these uncertainties the scenarios also roughly correspond to the scenarios 
created by SMURA & SORRI (2009) and can be considered as elaborations for those in terms 
of spectrum market formation. 124     No. 75, 3
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The constructed scenarios are summarized in Figure 3 that depicts an x-
axis ranging from a centrally controlled spectrum market where few entities 
manage the spectrum to a distributed one where the spectrum resource is 
controlled and brokered locally and a y-axis (U2) ranging from a highly 
vertically integrated industry structure where services, access and spectrum 
bands are bundled to a horizontal industry structure where each level of 
service delivery is fragmented and competition is high. The scenarios are 
further elaborated in the following subsections 11. 
Cellular operator bundled spectrum 
In the Bundled spectrum scenario spectrum management and brokering 
remains centralized and incumbent operators are able to meet a modestly 
growing demand mostly without flexible frequency usage. The regulator 
starts to conservatively liberalize spectrum regulation while keeping a close 
eye on the existence and quality of publicly important services. These 
opportunities are however leveraged only modestly by the incumbent 
operators (i.e. limited to spectrum refarming and technology upgrades within 
the same technology family). The liberalized spectrum regulation is not 
enough of an incentive for the incumbent operators to start leasing the 
spectrum. Instead operators hold on to the bands themselves and tie them 
to their own technologies and/or services. In some cases the Significant 
Market Power operators might trade or share bands with each other but all in 
all spectrum markets don't exist in their true sense. 
Local Area networks remain a marginal market and are mostly used 
privately. Overall traffic growth remains rather modest and most of the value 
is in easily used integrated services. A typical user has only one contractual 
agreement (with the cellular operator) for everything including access (and 
spectrum), terminal(s) and service. In terms of the system dynamics model 
depicted in Figure 2, the B_incub loop is almost the sole source of supply to 
the weak demand growth, with minor contributions coming also from 
B_regul, but the other balancing loops remain weak. R_vert loop in clearly 
stronger than B_horiz. 
                       
11 All in all it should be noted that these are extreme scenarios bounding the future and that the 
future is likely to be a combination of all of them. T. CASEY  125 
Figure 3 - Four future scenarios for spectrum markets 
 
Centralized spectrum brokers  
In this scenario flexible spectrum use becomes common and the 
spectrum brokering and monitoring system is centrally controlled. The traffic 
growth is tremendous and operators focus only on being bit pipes and 
facilitating connectivity. Spectrum regulation liberalization advances rapidly 
fueled partly by enhancements in device re-configurability. Cellular 
Operators take advantage of this and are able to provide more bandwidth to 
the end users without losing too much of the control and market to local 
operators. The centralized brokers manage a hierarchy of sub brokers that 
monitor the utilization of the spectrum resource and direct the spectrum 
resource to where it is most valued. The system is based on one or more 
dominant technologies and run by Cellular operators with possibly a 3
rd party 
broker working as a facilitator between them. A major part of the spectrum is 
owned by the cellular operators. Most of the radio intelligence remains in the 
network and in general the spectrum markets are centrally controlled. A 
typical user has only one contractual agreement for access and spectrum, 
but several for services and device(s). 
In terms of this scenario, in the system dynamic model in Figure 2, the 
B_incub loop is very strongly facilitated also by a strong B_regul cycle, that 126     No. 75, 3
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caters to most of the tremendous traffic demand growth. B_unlic and B_local 
are weak, meaning that the local area operators and the unlicensed band 
have a smaller role. B_horiz becomes stronger than R_vert reducing 
incumbent cellular operators to being huge (but possibly rather profitable) bit 
pipes. 
Intelligent devices rule 
This scenario assumes that remarkable advancements have been made 
in every respect of device intelligence but especially in spectrum sensing 
and other cognitive radio capabilities of devices. In this scenario radio 
intelligence and control is decentralized to the edges with devices 
themselves actively taking part in the spectrum leasing process, and 
collaborating in sensing and monitoring the utilization of the spectrum 
resource. Ownership of spectrum is also largely fragmented and localized. 
The tremendous growth in traffic demand leads to a very liberalized 
spectrum regulation regime, and to well functioning markets. This in turn 
leads to incumbent spectrum owners leasing and selling the spectrum to 
new entrants and local operators and eventually to the decentralization and 
fragmentation of access provisioning. The agile devices are able to tackle 
the technology heterogeneity, and access all networks automatically and 
seamlessly. The regulator has a lighter role and has given the control 
directly to local operators or to local authorities. Local brokers possibly 
facilitate the trading and leasing of spectrum for the devices and 
opportunistic access to the licensed bands is common and works without 
interference with legacy systems. Access and sharing can even be self-
regulated by a society of cognitive devices. Users have many contractual 
agreements (e.g. separate ones for access, spectrum brokering, services, 
and devices) but intelligent devices manage these on their behalf. 
In this scenario, in the system dynamic model in Figure 2, most of the 
demand is met with a strong B_local balancing loop. This is facilitated by 
strong B_regul and B_unlic balancing loops and the reinforcing loop R_local. 
The device intelligence leads to the decoupling of services from access and 
spectrum and hence B_horiz loop is stronger than R_vert. 
Access and spectrum aggregators 
In this scenario the decentralized and fragmented access provisioning 
and spectrum market is aggregated by service providers who have gained a T. CASEY  127 
dominant position in the value chain. The user has only one contractual 
agreement with a service provider and the service provider has several 
contractual agreements with access providers. By having roaming 
agreements with many access providers and also possibly with spectrum 
brokers a service provider, delivering its service over the spectrum, can 
provide seamless access for its users. The access providers would be totally 
transparent to the user and the service provider would control the network 
selection client in the terminal. Ownership of spectrum is also fragmented 
and localized with service providers often being an owner or aggregating 
many spectrum leases into geographically ubiquitous spectrum coverage for 
their services. 
In an extreme case a service provider could aggregate many local 
brokers and become a master broker offering a ubiquitous brokering service. 
With such a service spectrum bands could be reserved in advance from 
wherever the user might roam to. In a way this scenario could be seen as 
the innovative internet service world coming and taking over the spectrum 
market. In this scenario, in the system dynamic model in Figure 2, most of 
the demand is met with a strong B_local balancing loop (facilitated by 
B_regul, B_unlic and R_local) and R_vert becomes very strong compared to 
B_horizontal with the powerful service providers re-coupling spectrum and 
access to their services. 
Stakeholder analysis 
Last we will shortly describe the position of actors and stakeholders in the 
above described scenarios. Since the elements around the spectrum 
resource can be owned and operated by different stakeholders (depending 
on the scenario) we will illustrate the presence and control of each relevant 
stakeholder group over the key architectural components required for the 
service delivery infrastructure. The constellation of stakeholder groups in 
each of the four scenarios is presented in Figure 4. A stakeholder group is 
shown in rectangular from where the height illustrates the vertical presence 
in the service delivery infrastructure and the width roughly depicts the market 
share of the stakeholder group in that particular part of service delivery 12. 
                       
12 The stakeholder groups can have only partial control of a component and share it with other 
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Figure 4 - Presence of each relevant stakeholder group within the service delivery 
infrastructure in each of the four scenarios 
(*) 
 
(*) In addition to the scenarios presented by SMURA & SORRI (2009), the depicted scenarios 
also slightly resemble the value chains presented by CHAPIN & LEHR (2007). 
In the Bundled spectrum scenario the Cellular network operators control 
the entire service delivery infrastructure around the spectrum resource. This 
means that the operator partners with white label device vendors and third 
party service providers and ties the vertically integrated service under its 
brand. These incumbent Cellular operators have the upper hand in the value 
network in terms of bargaining with plenty of choices for partners. This also 
makes it very difficult for new Cellular operator entrants to come in to the 
market. 
In the centralized spectrum brokers scenario the Cellular operators 
control only the access infrastructure, the spectrum and the related markets. 
There can also be a centralized 3
rd party broker facilitating trade between 
the operators. In this scenario it is slightly easier for a new Cellular operator 
to enter the market. Since the Cellular operators are working in bit pipe 
mode, it leaves room for service providers and terminal vendors to become 
bigger players in the value chain. 
In the intelligent devices rule scenario the role of Cellular network 
operators becomes limited and most of the connectivity is provided by T. CASEY  129 
several Local Access operators. Since spectrum ownership is fragmented 
and localized this scenario could also call forth many local 3
rd party spectrum 
brokers facilitating the market between spectrum owners and the users. 
Since the service delivery infrastructure is very fragmented intelligent 
terminals and connectivity manager clients and their vendors and producers 
would have an important role. 
In the access and spectrum broker aggregators scenario the service 
providers have a strong hold of the service delivery infrastructure. They 
would partner with white label device vendors, cellular and local area access 
operators and spectrum brokers in order to provide one vertically bundled 
service for the customer and tie the service under their brand. Therefore 
these service providers would have the upper hand in bargaining power over 
other actors in the value chain.  
Summary and conclusions  
In this paper we have studied different long term macro level evolution 
possibilities for how market driven spectrum management could come about. 
The scenario planning method and system dynamics were used to build four 
alternative future scenarios that were based on two key uncertainties: the 
decentralization and locality of the spectrum markets and the vertical 
integration in the industry around the spectrum resource.  
The four scenarios were: Cellular operator bundled spectrum (vertical 
industry structure with centralized spectrum markets), Centralized spectrum 
brokers (horizontal industry structure with centralized spectrum markets), 
Intelligent devices rule (horizontal industry structure with decentralized 
spectrum markets), and Access and spectrum aggregators (vertical industry 
structure with decentralized spectrum markets).  
The scenarios represent extreme cases and the future is likely to be a 
combination of all of them. The presented system dynamic model on the 
other hand illustrates the dynamics of the identified forces shaping the 
spectrum market and the possible evolution paths leading to the scenarios. 
Based on the analysis, changes in forces like the demand for new spectrum 
or advancements in device intelligence might have an important role in 
defining the end result. Further work could include more elaborate and 
quantitative modeling of the identified forces. 
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